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sions. In particular, conditioning the sample on having employer-provided health benefits eliminates the disparity in health coverage, narrows the average wage differential slightly, 9While we present estimates for this more inclusive sample to explore whether our findings from the sample restricted to married men with insurance benefits are robust to the potential selection bias noted above, these estimates can also be interpreted as a policy evaluation of an imperfectly targeted intervention to relieve job lock. Specifically, if the intent of SCHIP was to relieve job lock among low-earning workers, the "intent-to-treat" effect of such an intervention would be dulled by the existence of newly eligible working adults without health insurance benefits at their current job.
and eliminates the difference in the propor tion union. Moreover, as is evident in SCHIP in each year, we then identify the moth ers and fathers of these children (either both parents or only one, depending on who was present in the household), using the mother and father identification codes provided in the SIPP's records of the children and the personal identification codes for the parents. At this point, we restrict the adult sample to married fathers of SCHIP-eligible children who were employed in the first month of each panel.
Measuring Job Mobility
To measure job mobility, we construct an indicator variable for each employed father of a SCHIP-eligible child that is equal to one if the father separated from his employer over the course of one year. We identifyjob separa tors from a series of employer identification codes constructed from the interview control cards used by the SIPP surveyors.
In the first-wave interview, the SIPP interviewers recorded the identity of the (Bansak and Raphgael 2006) shows that the majority of separations were recorded between waves (a common "seaming" problem that has been noted previously in the SIPP), and thus information on the reason for the switch is missing for the majority of observations. (1) is the raw difference with no controls. Specification (2) adds all of the control variables listed in Table 4 with the exception of wages, plus twelve industry dummies and six occupation dummies.
Age is entered as a third-order polynomial. Specification (3) adds a full set of state fixed effects and a complete set of dummy variables for income relative to the poverty line (measured in 25 percentage point increments). Specifica tion (4) adds log wages.
For the difference-in-difference estimates, all specifications include a dummy variable for not having an insured spouse along with an interaction term between this variable and the 2001 year dummy. In this model, the effects of the explanatory variables are constrained to be constant across the two groups.
Difference is statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
the separation rate declined slightly over the study period (a statistically insignificant decline of 2.9 percentage points). For those without insured spouses, the separation rates increased by 6.1 percentage points (p-value < .01). The unadjusted difference-in-differ ence calculation yields a job lock estimate of 9 percentage points (p-value = 0.0904). Table 4. in-difference in these changes in separation rates. We present estimates for each of the two alternative samples used in Table  3 using four different model specifications. The first specification presents the unad justed estimates reproduced from Finally, shown in the last column of Table 5 is a series of triple-difference estimates, equal to the difference-in-difference estimate for fathers of the SCHIP-eligible minus the dif ference-in-difference for the higher-income fathers of ineligible children. In addition, our findings demonstrate that exogenous government policy-related variation in the factors that tend to tie work ers to their jobs can be exploited to identify and gauge job lock. To our knowledge, only the present paper and Gruber and Madrian (1994) have examined the effects of policy induced variation in job lock across those with and without alternative sources of cov erage. Among studies that exploit variation in health conditions or other predictors of individual valuation of health benefits, none have made use of policy variation. However, the proscriptions against the long-term exclu sion of coverage for pre-existing conditions introduced in the 1996 Health Insurance Por tability and Accountability Act may provide an opportunity to improve on studies exploiting this latter identification strategy.
